

# PERFORMATIVITY ON THE NET: “PROTOCOLICAL MANAGEMENT” AND THE “SOCIETIES OF CONTROL”<sup>1</sup>

Martin Procházka

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**Abstract:** In contrast to Foucault’s concept of “the political technologies of individuals,” the Internet protocol (theorised, e.g., by Alexander Galloway) can be interpreted as an instance of a political technology of “dividuals” (Gilles Deleuze). The performance of protocols, or the execution of “distributed management”, is based – among others – on a problematic identification of life with a code and a medium. It is believed to generate a new form of life, described as a “cybernetic system of man and machine” (Galloway) and a new type of individual who differs from the subject of the Enlightenment liberalism. On the one hand, these individuals are mere “body-objects,” on the other hand they are endowed by a power of resistance. This is paradoxical, if not absurd, since “by definition, there can be no resistance to protocol” (Galloway). The most problematic example of “protocolical management” is the technique of “collaborative filtering” (typical of the “recommendation engines”), which opens the network to homogenizing manipulation of political or economic forces. Individuals active on the net are processed into “dividuals” (or sets of statistical data comprised in their diverse profiles), whose “personal identity is formed only on certain hegemonic patterns” (Galloway). As a result, the “bio-political self-organization” of “the multitude” (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri), is supplanted by the operation of social media platforms. These function as “plateaus of intensity,” which construct “continuums of intensity” (Deleuze and Guattari) out of the affects, emotions and desires of their users, who have become “dividuals.” The social media platforms enable “the operation of markets,” both economic and political, to function as “the instrument of social control” (Deleuze).

**Keywords:** biopolitics, Internet protocol, protocolical management, distributed network, society of control, dividuals, collaborative filtering, recommendation engines, Gilles Deleuze, Alexander Galloway

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Exploring internet communication requires, among others, a reconsideration of Michel Foucault's views of modern society based on "political technologies of individuals."<sup>2</sup> Instead of Foucault's assumption of the movement of individuals through a small number of closed environments or institutions of "the disciplinary society"<sup>3</sup> (family, school, army, factory, clinic and prison), a different perspective of social organization offers itself based on the theory of dynamic "non-equilibrium systems." These have been described in nature,<sup>4</sup> but function also in today's democratic societies, where political institutions, individual and social life, its values and security, are under constant attack of populism, extremism and terrorism. Recent theories of borders as the effect of migration flows<sup>5</sup> are an example of the study of the society as a non-equilibrium system.<sup>6</sup>

This approach, however, also requires going beyond the theories of the Internet as a "distributed network."<sup>7</sup> The "contradiction" between the dynamic, "rhizomatic," and static, hierarchical, features is at the core of the theory of the "protocological

- 2 Michel Foucault, "The Political Technologies of Individuals," in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 145-62. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, some utopian projects of government (Louis Turquet de Mayenne, Nicolas Delamare) coin the term "police" as a new form of government consisting in the care of the "conveniences of life" (157): "Happiness of individuals is a requirement for the survival and development of state. It is [...] an instrument and not simply a consequence. [...] individuals with all their social relations, are now the true object of the police" (158). The shift from these utopian views is evident in the second half of the eighteenth century, in the concept of *Polizeiwissenschaft* coined by Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, who sees the role of the police in constant interfering with the lives of individuals, seen as a population. The state "wields its power over living beings, and its politics, therefore, has to be a biopolitics" (160). Since "the modern political rationality is permitted by the antinomy of law and order" which the state cannot "reconcile" (161), biopolitics, as the strategy of developing political technologies of individuals becomes the basis of political rationality, or the "ontology" of social being.
- 3 Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control" (1990), trans. Martin Joughin, *October* 59, no. 4 (1992): 3-7.
- 4 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature* (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), 160-70.
- 5 See, e.g., Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
- 6 "The society of control" behaves like a non-equilibrium system. See Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control," 4-5.
- 7 Alexander R. Galloway, *Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization* (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 2004), 8. Subsequent references to page numbers are given in parentheses in the text.

management" of the Internet (8). On the one hand, "protocol is a distributed management system that allows control to exist within a heterogeneous material milieu," on the other hand, certain protocols, namely the DNS (Domain Name System) produce information that "focuses control into rigidly defined hierarchies" (8). As a result, "nearly all Web traffic must submit to a hierarchical structure (DNS) to gain access to the anarchic and radically horizontal structure of the Internet" (9).

Evidently, recent discussions of political and cultural aspects of the protocol transcend the limits of cybernetics, as envisioned by its founder, Norbert Wiener,<sup>8</sup> as well as of the narrowly (technologically) understood computer science. The "biopolitical" perspective outlined by Foucault<sup>9</sup> requires abandoning rhetorical operators (theories of metaphor), symbolic thought, semiotic approaches as well as theories of models, and focusing on complex decentralized structural patterns, such as the "'non-human' enunciation, a proto-subjective diagram," first described by Félix Guattari and later used by the theorists of the distributed communication systems.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> "[S]ociety can only be understood through a study of the messages and communication facilities which belong to it; [...]. To live effectively is to live with adequate information. Thus, communication and control belong to an essence of man's inner life, even as they belong to his life in society." Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1954) 16, 18.

<sup>9</sup> Apart from "The Political Technologies of Individuals," biopolitics is discussed in Foucault's *History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction* (1976), trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978) or in *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-79* (2004), trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

<sup>10</sup> "What we need here is a distinction between on the one hand semiologies that produce significations, the common currency of social groups – like the 'human' enunciation of people who work with machines – and on the other, a-signifying semiotics which, regardless of the quantity of significations they convey, handle figures of expression that might be qualified as 'non-human' (such as equations and plans which enunciate the machine and make it act in a diagrammatic capacity on technical and experimental apparatuses). [...] Structuralists [...] have postulated a general signifying translatability for all forms of discursivity. But in so doing, have they not misunderstood the essential dimension of machinic autopoiesis? [...] Structure implies feedback loops, it puts into play a concept of totalisation that it itself masters. [...] The machine, on the contrary, is shaped by a desire for abolition. Its emergence is doubled with breakdown, catastrophe – the menace of death. It possesses a supplement: a dimension of alterity which it develops in different forms. This alterity differentiates it from structure, which is based on a principle of homeomorphism. The difference supplied by machinic autopoiesis is based on disequilibrium [...]. And this doesn't simply involve a rupture of formal equilibrium, but a radical ontological reconversion. The machine always depends on

The inherent problem of this approach consists in the clash between the biopolitical perspective and a conventional organization technology, namely “layering” as a “central concept of the regulation of information.”<sup>11</sup> Instead of the hierarchic tree pattern and the structuralist model of functional strata (or, in Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s terminology, “the planes of organization and development” concerned with “form or substance”<sup>12</sup>), a dynamic notion of “plateaus of intensity” offers itself, communicating on “the plane of consistency.”<sup>13</sup> As Deleuze and Guattari have shown, “the plane of consistency *constructs continuums of intensity*: it creates continuity for intensities that it extracts from distinct forms and substances.”<sup>14</sup>

Creating “continuums of intensity,” the plane of consistency does not consolidate by means of unification, stratification or hierarchization. It never schematizes to reduce multiplicities by means of a common principle or purpose. It “ties together heterogeneous, disparate elements as such: it assures the consolidation of fuzzy aggregates, in other words, multiplicities of the rhizome type.”<sup>15</sup>

Deleuze’s and Guattari’s notions of “the plane of consistency” and “continuums of intensity” are in contradiction with the traditional, hierarchical structure of the Internet. It is highly questionable whether this “contradictory

exterior elements in order to be able to exist as such. It implies a complementarity, not just with the man who fabricates it, makes it function or destroys it, but it is itself in a relation of alterity with other virtual or actual machines – a ‘non-human’ enunciation, a proto-subjective diagram.” Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-aesthetic Paradigm* (1992), trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), 36-37. On the distributed communication systems, see Galloway, *Protocol*, 3: “diagram is the *distributed network*, a structural form without center that resembles a web or meshwork. The technology is the digital *computer*, an abstract machine able to perform the work of any other machine (provided it can be described logically). The management style is *protocol*, the principle of organization native to computers in distributed networks. All three come together to define a new apparatus of control that has achieved importance at the start of the new millennium.” See also Eugene Thacker, “Foreword: Protocol Is as Protocol Does,” in Galloway, *Protocol*, xix: “a network-as-diagram offers all sorts of possibilities for organization, regulation, and management.”

<sup>11</sup> Thacker, “Foreword,” xxi.

<sup>12</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980), trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN, and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 507.

<sup>13</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 69–70, 157–58, 251–52, 254, 506–508.

<sup>14</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 70.

<sup>15</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 508.

logic" can produce a "dialectical tension" (9, 8) in theoretical terms, and, practically, become a prerequisite of efficient functioning of the Internet as a management and control system. The problem can be seen both in Galloway's synecdochic use of the term "protocol," making it a synonym of "multiple, nested protocols" (10), and in his problematic use of the term "control" which significantly deviates from previous theories of control in contemporary societies, especially from Gilles Deleuze's "Postscript on the Societies of Control."<sup>16</sup>

In contrast to Galloway's concept of the Internet as a control system based on the dialectical tension between the "rhizomatic" and "hierarchical" features of its protocols, Deleuze's "society of control" displays no central "dialectical" contradiction; instead, all individual and social "states" are "metastable [...]" coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation." As a result,

what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a *password*, while on the other hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by *watchwords* (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it.<sup>17</sup>

There is no longer an opposition of the individual versus the mass typical of the period of Modernism.<sup>18</sup> Individuals have turned into "*dividuals*" and masses are transformed into "samples, data, markets, or '*banks*.'"<sup>19</sup> Whereas the "disciplinary man" is a "discontinuous producer of energy" moulded and propelled by a series of closed institutions, human beings in the society of control are "undulatory [...], surfing [...] in continuous network."<sup>20</sup>

Their freedom, however, is only illusory – they are controlled by corporations and marketing in business as well as in politics. They fall into debts and may end up homeless or in ghettos and slums. The rapid development of information technologies enables to locate "dividuals" by means of their communication

<sup>16</sup> Deleuze, "Societies of Control," 3-7.

<sup>17</sup> Deleuze, "Societies of Control," 5.

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1932), 11-19. Deleuze approaches the opposition from a different perspective of a bureaucratic system: "The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that designates the *individual*, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a *mass*;" Deleuze, "Societies of Control," 5.

<sup>19</sup> Deleuze, "Societies of Control," 5.

<sup>20</sup> Deleuze, "Societies of Control," 5-6.

devices, cameras and face-recognition, algorithms of search engines and deep datamining of social networks.

The society of control is organized as a seemingly “open environment,”<sup>21</sup> which, however, is nothing more than a subtle synthesis and subsequent transformation of all closed environments of the disciplinary society.<sup>22</sup> Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that the society of control is a product of the development of machines and information technologies. Just on the contrary: machines only express “those social forms capable of generating them and using them.”<sup>23</sup>

One of the core concepts of Galloway’s theory of the protocol, “distributed management,” is derived – in a rather disputable way – from a materialist interpretation of the thought experiment of James Clerk Maxwell known as Maxwell’s demon and based on his exploration of a non-equilibrium system of gas with molecules of different kinetic temperatures. In his brief and vague contribution to the still ongoing discussion of Maxwell’s demon, Sanford Kwinter claims that the basis of the thought experiment is no mere “mechanical or energetic relation,” but “something new,” namely “a system of *distributed management* that could not be dissociated from the material milieus whose particles and behavioral quirks were being managed.”<sup>24</sup>

However, recent probabilistic approaches to non-equilibrium systems have demonstrated that instead of *managing* the “behavioural quirks” of particles, it is important to study the “mutual information”<sup>25</sup> or the measure of dependence between correlated random variables in the system and the amount of information

<sup>21</sup> Deleuze, “Societies of Control,” 7.

<sup>22</sup> “The family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner – state or private power – but coded figures – deformable and transformable – of a single corporation that now has only stockholders.” Deleuze, “Societies of Control,” 6.

<sup>23</sup> Deleuze, “Societies of Control,” 6.

<sup>24</sup> Sanford Kwinter, “Introduction: War in Peace,” in Branden Hookway, ed., *Pandemonium: The Rise of Predatory Locales in the Postwar Period* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 10.

<sup>25</sup> Mutual information measures the quantity of information about one of the variables gained by observing the other variable. It enables the differentiation between the joint and marginal distribution of random variables as well as the distinction between the *joint*, *individual* and *conditional* entropy. The theory of “mutual information” was developed by Claude E. Shannon in the article “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” *Bell System Technical Journal*, 27, no. 3 (1948): 379-423. The term “mutual information” was coined by R.M. Fano and appeared first in an article by J.G. Kreer, “A Question of Terminology,” *IRE Transactions on Information Theory*, 3,3 (1957): 208.

they share. For instance, in search engine technology, mutual information between phrases and their contexts is used to find semantic clusters.<sup>26</sup>

The probabilistic approaches correlating random variables in non-equilibrium systems have already been used in a number of disciplines, including neuroscience, genetics, medicine, biology, informatics or electrical engineering. Individual examples include the research of neural coding,<sup>27</sup> regulatory gene interaction<sup>28</sup> or genetic coupling of neurotransmitter identity and electrophysiological phenotype.<sup>29</sup>

In view of this, Galloway's attempts to identify life with "a code" or "a medium" (111)<sup>30</sup> appear rash and ungrounded. Although it is beyond any doubt that the ability of resisting entropy is common to organisms as well as machines,<sup>31</sup> this does not yet imply that living organisms and machines can merge in a new form of life based on "a special isomorphism between electronic computers and human nervous system" and described as "the cybernetic system of man and machine" (106).<sup>32</sup> Therefore, to conflate "life itself" with "the building blocks of the basic

<sup>26</sup> David M. Magerman and Mitchell P. Marcus, "Parsing a Natural Language Using Mutual Information Statistics," *AAAI-90 Proceedings of the Eight National Conference on Artificial Intelligence* (Cambridge, MA: AAAI Press and MIT Press, 1990), 984-89. For recent research on parsing, see, e.g., Jiaqi Li et al., "A Survey of Discourse Parsing," *Frontiers of Computer Science*, 16, no. 5 (2022): 1-12.

<sup>27</sup> Naama Brenner et al., "Synergy in a Neural Code," *Neural Computing*, 12, no. 7 (2000): 1531-52.

<sup>28</sup> John Watkinson et al., "Inference of Regulatory Gene Interactions from Expression Data Using Three-Way Mutual Information," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1158, no. 1 (2009): 302-13.

<sup>29</sup> Mónica Tapia et al., "Neurotransmitter Identity and Electrophysiological Phenotype Are Genetically Coupled in Midbrain Dopaminergic Neurons," *Scientific Reports*, 8 (2018): 13637.

<sup>30</sup> "This historical moment – when life is defined no longer as essence, but as code – is the moment when life *becomes a medium*."

<sup>31</sup> Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, 34. Cf. Galloway, *Protocol*, 105.

<sup>32</sup> On the one hand, Galloway admits that this notion of life attributed to Wiener "has more utopian possibilities than it has derisive possibilities" (107), on the other hand, he rashly identifies this hypothetical "system of man and machine" with a prerequisite of a materialist world view: "Wiener [...] valued the contingency of matter, be it man or machine. He recognized that material reality is the *most* important thing and that, contrary to a more static Newtonian view of matter, it *can change*" (107). However, Wiener's analogy between human beings and machines can by no means be considered as a manifestation of a materialist world view: it is based on the ability to perform *feedback*, which, in Wiener's words, consists in the "control of a machine on the basis of its *actual* performance rather than its *expected* performance;" Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, 24. Moreover, the notion of feedback is no "simple idea," as Galloway

calculations of computer science" (112)<sup>33</sup> is not only utopian, but also reductionist, confusing "life" in its endless variety and complexity with laboratory experiments in DNA nanotechnology.

Galloway's description of protocol as "a system of management [...] in a space populated by a multitude of independent, vital agents" and always "connected to the material milieu inhabited by those agents – their spaces and their own material bodies" (82) does not adequately represent the protocol as a general "management style" (87) of the Internet, let alone of the "society of control." To make his argument credible, Galloway refers this "system of management" to a utopian "new type of individual," who is "not the same" as "the subject of enlightenment liberalism, [...] an extension (perhaps) of the modern dream of individuality and independence" (160).<sup>34</sup> Instead of painting this utopian future, which, by the way, strongly reminds of the communist propaganda of the 1950s and 1960s, one should view the society of control as a product of the management of Deleuze's "dividuals."

assumes (106). Discarding Galloway's materialist propaganda, we can refer feedback to the *mutual information* phenomenon described above. Finally, Wiener's view of humans and machines as "communicative organisms" (*The Human Use of Human Beings*, 164) does not imply their identification. During the "first industrial revolution," Wiener contends, "the communicative characters of man and machine impinge on each other." The "second industrial revolution," he continues, characterized by the use of computers in automatic factories, "may be used for the benefit of humanity" as well as lead to "a decade or more of ruin and despair" (*The Human Use of Human Beings* 164, 189). Galloway's feeble attempt to explain Wiener's scepticism by the outcomes of World War II and threats of a nuclear disaster does not respond to Wiener's argument. No wonder Galloway's conclusion is fully in line with a simplistic materialist ideology identifying the protocol with "the self-determinism of material systems": "The self-determinism of material systems is therefore the essence of cybernetics, and it is a positive essence, one that also reflects the positive potential of protocological organization" (107).

<sup>33</sup> This rash identification is based on the first discoveries in DNA-computing made by Leonard Adelman in 1994 (the so-called "Adelman machine"). Significant progress in the research of communication between DNA and silicon chips (DNA-chips) occurred only after the publication of Galloway's book. Galloway's conclusions are based on secondary journalistic sources (*New York Times*) and do not reflect the complexity of the actual research, as well as the shortcomings of DNA computing, especially the "slow processing speed of a DNA computer" and the difficulty to analyze its answers; "DNA Computing," *Wikipedia*, accessed 23 July 2024, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA\\_computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA_computing).

<sup>34</sup> Galloway's utopian views contrast with Félix Guattari's "ontologically heterogeneous modes of subjectivity, constellations of incorporeal Universes of reference which take the position of partial enunciators in multiple domains of alterity, or more precisely, domains of alterification;" Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, 45.

This is unwittingly confirmed by Galloway's doubtful views of authenticity and identity, conflating both these notions as mere products of biometrical data: "Authenticity (identity) is once again inside the body-object, yet it appears now in sequences, samples, and scans" (113). On the one hand, Galloway's "new" individuals are mere "body-objects," on the other hand, these "objects" are endowed with a power of "resistance," which, however, is not typical of the society of control but of the preceding disciplinary society (86). Moreover, this "resistance" appears paradoxical, if not absurd, since "by definition, there can be no resistance to protocol. *Opposing protocol is like opposing gravity [...]*" (147). These attempts to explain the society of control as a positive outcome of "protocological management" by means of the distributed network of the Internet display a number of inconsistencies.

A most problematic example of "protocological management" based on the "quantification of living forms" is the technique of "collaborative filtering," which, according to Galloway, "allows one to predict new characteristics (particularly one's so-called desires) based on survey data" (113).<sup>35</sup> The main product of a survey based on all kinds of users' network activities are their profiles compared to profiles of other users in a data pool. The statistical algorithms may then predict potential likes and dislikes of an individual user. Moreover, they not only "determine" but also "inflect the identity" of a user and thus "ensure structural homogeneity" (114).

In this way, the "protocological network of autonomous agents" (164) is open both to a homogenizing manipulation of political or economic forces and to the disruptions caused by activities of terrorists and hackers. Individuals are processed into "dividuals" (sets of statistical data comprised in their profiles), whose "personal identity is formed only on certain hegemonic patterns" (114). Based on "distributed management," control degenerates into a chaos manipulated not by algorithms (these are mere technological means) but by powerful political or corporate players on the net. Hackers, once productive "protocological actors par excellence," responsible for evolutionary "transformations"

<sup>35</sup> Some features of Galloway's essentially positive account on "collaborative filtering" resemble other contemporary approaches. See, e.g., Loreen Terveen and Will Hill, "Beyond Recommender Systems: Helping Other People Help Each Other," in *Human-computer Interaction in the New Millennium*, ed. John M. Carroll (New York: ACM Press and Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2001), 487-505. For technological aspects of collaborative filtering see, e.g., Xiaoyuan Su and Taghi M. Khoshgoftaar, "A Survey of Collaborative Filtering Techniques," *Advances in Artificial Intelligence*, 1 (2009): 1-19. For more recent approaches, see Michael Schrage, *Recommendation Engines* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2020), especially 109-48.

of the protocol and displaying its power, “particularly its ability to compel autonomous actors toward a more vital or affective state within their [...] milieu” (157-58, 167), are persecuted as criminals or degraded into mere mercenaries of the big internet manipulators. “Protocological network of autonomous agents” (164),<sup>36</sup> “electronic ad-hocracies”<sup>37</sup> and “bio-political self-organization” of “the multitude,”<sup>38</sup> dreamt of by the authors at the outset of this century, have been supplanted by social media platforms. These also function as “plateaus of intensity” (see above), which construct continuums of intensity<sup>39</sup> out of the affects, emotions and desires of their users, who have become “dividuals.” Instead of compelling “autonomous actors toward a more vital or affective state,” the plateaus of intensity thus enable “the operation of markets,” both economic and political, to function as “the instrument of social control.”<sup>40</sup> They have also become powerful weapons of aggressive dictatorial governments fomenting social conflicts and escalating them into a hybrid warfare.

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<sup>36</sup> “Hackers are autonomous agents that can mass together in small groups to attack specific problems” (159).

<sup>37</sup> Bruce Sterling, *The Hacker Crackdown* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 184: “‘Ad-hocracy’ would rule, with groups of people spontaneously knitting together across organizational lines, tackling the problem at hand, applying intense computer-aided expertise to it, and then vanishing whence they came.” In the early days of the Internet, Sterling cherished hopes that hackers will become the agents of “the freewheeling intellectual exploration of the highest and deepest potential of computer systems;” Sterling, *The Hacker Crackdown*, 51. Ad-hocracies are bio-political groupings of computer specialists working in the ways pioneered by hackers.

<sup>38</sup> Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 411: “The multitude is bio-political self-organization.” Cf. Galloway, *Protocol*, 161.

<sup>39</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 69–70, 157-58, 251-52, 254, 506-508.

<sup>40</sup> Deleuze, “Societies of Control,” 6. In the same passage, Deleuze compares Foucault’s “discipline” with his notion of “control”: “Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and discontinuous” (6).

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